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It is hypothesized that suppressing attitude-related thoughts can strengthen the 
corresponding attitude. According to the ironic process theory of Wegner (1994), 
thought suppression should make the inhibited thoughts more accessible. Previous 
researches (e.g., Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; Wegner & Gold, 1995; 
Macrea, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994) also demonstrated that thought 
suppression not only can lead to higher thought occurrence (cognitive rebound), but 
also can result in greater emotional arousal (emotional rebound) and higher 
inclination to perform behaviors that are consistent with the suppressed thoughts 
(behavioral rebound). In the current research, attitude strength was examined as a 
function of attitude-related thoughts suppression in three studies using different 
operationalizations. In Study 1, attitude certainty and actual-reported weight 
discrepancy were examined using self-report. In Study 2, two behavioral measures 
(food voucher choice and passage choice) were utilized to examine the likelihood the 
participants who suppressed their thoughts performed attitude-consistent behaviors. In 
Study 3, automatic attitudes were measured using Sequential Priming Procedure that 
has been shown to effectively assess automatically activated attitudes (e.g., Fazio, 
2001).  
All three studies confirmed the main hypothesis. Study 1 indicated that the 
vi 
 
participants who suppressed their positive thoughts about thinness subsequently 
indicated higher confidence about their attitudes towards thinness in comparison to 
those who expressed the same thoughts. Furthermore, the suppressors also reported 
weights that were significantly lighter than their actual weights, but this discrepancy 
was not observed in those who expressed the thoughts as they reported rather accurate 
weights. In Study 2, the tendency to choose healthier food and physical fitness 
passage was also shown to be higher for the participants who suppressed positive 
thoughts about thinness in comparison to those who expressed the same thoughts. 
Study 3 demonstrated that both positive automatic attitudes towards thinness and 
negative automatic attitudes towards fatness were shown to be stronger as a result of 
suppressing positive thoughts about thinness and negative thoughts about fatness 
respectively. However, those who expressed the same thoughts and those who were 
not instructed to either express or suppress their thoughts did not demonstrate 
enhanced automatic attitudes.  
 In sum, attitude strength was enhanced as a result of thought suppression. The 
findings were in line with the prediction of Ironic Process Theory and were in 
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To live harmoniously in the social world, since childhood we are instilled various 
rules, regulations, and obligations, and since then follow the social norms and the 
codes of conduct we have learnt. It is in this way, social order and functionality can be 
maintained, by which the balance between personal freedom and social systems are 
kept at a level that individuals’ rights can be defended while personal goals can be 
pursued. However, we sometimes find conflicts between what we want to do and what 
we should do. For instance, to avoid undesired consequences, we abide by rules 
although we do not like the rules, we strive to concentrate on our work despite 
distracting activities, we restrain ourselves from food we want when we are on diet, 
and we seek to cover up secrets to avoid social discord. It is often in such situations 
that exerting control over thoughts is necessary. Although it is tempting to think that 
we can change our unwanted responses or habits solely by such conscious and 
deliberate mental efforts, the reality is that it is difficult to have a full control over the 
psychological processes.  
Researchers have shown that efforts in suppressing unwanted thoughts often 
prove to be futile (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992). The undesired thoughts that we want 
to get rid of include thoughts that can directly elicit unwanted feelings (e.g. personal 
failures) as well as thoughts that challenge moral standards or social standards (e.g., 
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stereotypic thoughts). Thoughts that are associated with negative emotions are 
especially the ones that people are inclined to suppress. However, numerous studies 
have shown that efforts in exerting such mental control tend to cause a paradoxical 
rebound effect in the form of more frequent resurgence of the same unwanted 
thoughts (e.g., Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). That is, it is likely that the more 
thoughts are suppressed, the more accessible they become. The once banished 
thoughts would come back to mind, sometimes more vigorously than before. For 
example, one study showed that participants who suppressed anxious thoughts about 
an imminent threat experienced increased frequency of anxiety-provoking thoughts 
and also more anxiety (Koster, Rassin, Crombez, & Naring, 2003). Often, this 
rebound effect also results in feelings of failure and a sense of losing control over 
oneself (Kelly & Kahn, 1994).  
Past studies on the ironic rebound effects have examined a range of thought 
contents that include thoughts about stereotypes (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, 
& Jetten,1994), stressful memories (Klein & Bratton, 2007), thoughts concerning 
diseases like cancer (Cordova, Giese-Davis, Golant, Kronnenwetter, Chang, McFarlin, 
& Spiegel, 2003) and anger thoughts (Burns, Quartana, Gilliam, Gray, Matsuura, 
Nappi, Wolfe, & Lofland, 2008). These findings concerning rebound effects can be 
explained by the ironic process theory concerning mental control posited by Wegner 
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(1994), in that the once prohibited information would be made more accessible or 
more intrusive as a result of suppression. This theory states that when a person intends 
to suppress a thought, two cognitive processes are initiated. A controlled operation 
process searches for distracters to replace the inhibited thoughts. This operation 
process is effortful, conscious and demands cognitive capacity. At the same time, an 
autonomic monitoring process is executed effortlessly and unconsciously to search for 
any trace of undesired information in mind. This monitoring process serves as a 
feedback mechanism that reinitiates the operation process once the unwanted 
information is detected. It is this process that renders the inhibited thoughts more 
accessible and more likely to return to consciousness.  
However, very few studies focus on the effect of suppression on attitude strength. 
This issue deserves study because the influence of attitude has been shown to be 
pervasive in daily life while the act of suppressing is also commonly practiced either 
consciously or unconsciously with strong consequences. At times, for many reasons 
we need to avoid expressing our negative opinions or negative feelings about 
something which we hold negative attitudes towards. For example, in order to live in 
amity with housemates, one may want to conceal personal negative attitudes from 
them and avoid unintentionally displaying adverse facial expressions during 
interactions. Similarly, people often endorse negative attitudes towards fat individuals 
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or homosexuals. Because they know they should not hold such attitudes, they often 
want to avoid thinking about them. Likewise, one may dislike certain household 
chores but still persist doing them and try to ignore the feelings towards the chores. At 
other times, the attitude object is positive and desirable rather than negative and 
undesirable. For example, some people may want to suppress positive thoughts about 
some desired products (such as attire, car, and computer) and inhibit their purchasing 
impulses, and some other people would waver between their desires to indulge in 
pornography and their religious beliefs. When these contradictions arise, attitude 
suppression is likely to occur.  
This research examined the hypothesis that suppressing attitude-related thoughts 
might strengthen the associated attitudes. This proposed process is consistent with an 
associative network model of cognition (e.g., Anderson, 1976) and also with the fact 
that attitude consists of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. This model 
states that information is meaningfully interconnected with each other with different 
strength in memory. Therefore, when a construct is activated, other semantically 
associated constructs are also activated due to spreading activation. In other words, 
when an attitude-associated thought is activated (due to the repeated activation of the 
thought that results from the suppression mechanism), the thought related emotions, 
behavioral experiences and attitude stored in memory could also be activated. In 
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addition, Fazio (1989, 2001) suggests that the representations of an attitude object and 
the attitude are interconnected. Therefore, when thoughts of the attitude object 
become more accessible, the corresponding attitude would also be activated, and 
strengthened.  
Therefore, the objective of this research is to examine whether suppressing 
attitude-related thoughts intensifies that attitude. To this end, we focused on positive 
attitudes towards thinness. In Studies 1 to 3, we had participants suppress their 
positive views of thinness and predicted that these positive attitudes would become 
stronger at post-suppression stage. In addition, in Study 3, to explore the generability 
of the finding, we also examined negative attitudes towards fatness; likewise, we had 
some participants suppressed their negative views of fatness and predicted that these 
negative attitudes would be stronger later at the post-suppression stage. To provide 
convergent evidence over different dimensions of attitude strength, attitude strength 
(Krosnick & Smith, 1994; Krosnick & Petty, 1994; Raden, 1985) was operationalized 
as attitude certainty in Study 1 (Holland, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 2003; 
Fazio & Zanna, 1978), behavioral manifestations in Study 2 (Henderson, de Liver, & 
Gollwitzer, 2008), and automatic attitude in Study 3 (Fazio, 1989, 2001; Henderson, 
De Liver, & Gollwitzer, 2008). Particularly, the intensified attitude ensued from 
thought suppression is hypothesized to enhance the confidence the suppressors have 
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that their attitude is correct in Study 1, increase the tendency the suppressors 
performing attitude-congruent behaviors in Study 2, and facilitate automatic 
activation of attitudes in Study 3.  
Suppression 
 In daily practices, people may consciously or unintentionally suppress their 
unwanted thoughts. Generally, in the experiments on thought suppression, participants 
were instructed to either direct their attention away from certain object or focus their 
attention on the object. Specifically, the participants who were randomly assigned to 
the suppression condition were instructed not to think of a particular object or issue 
for a short duration; whereas the participants who were assigned to the control 
condition were not asked to avoid the same thoughts(e.g., Lane & Wegner, 1995; 
Wenzlaff et al., 1988). In other studies (Wegner et al., 1987; Kelly & Kahn, 1994), the 
participants in the control condition were instructed to express the same thoughts. In 
addition, in some studies, the participants were asked to verbally express their 
thoughts according to the instruction (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner & Gold, 
1995), whereas in others, the participants were asked to write down their thoughts 
(e.g., Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Borton, Markowitz, & Dieterich, 2005). After this 
manipulation, the amount of occurrence of the same thought was then measured in the 
post-suppression phase.   
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The history of suppression research can be traced back to Freud’s notion of 
repression (Freud, 1984). Repression is described as an important defense mechanism, 
which pushes unacceptable thoughts, prohibited impulses, and painful and unbearable 
childhood memories out of awareness. The repressed threatening information remains 
in the unconsciousness, while keeping it out of mind exhausts psychological energy. 
Therefore, Freud suggested that such repression can backfire, in the sense that the 
repressed information could affect behaviors and could be the root of subsequent 
psychological and physiological symptoms.  
Freud’s notions about repression correspond with a more recent ironic process 
theory (Wegner, 1994) and the proposed rebound effect of thought suppression. A 
classic experiment conducted by Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) 
demonstrated that thought suppression is difficult. Even with the motivation to 
suppress, the participants failed to do so. In this study, the participants who initially 
suppressed white-bear thoughts subsequently reported more of such thoughts, as 
compared to their counterparts who initially expressed the same thoughts. Essentially, 
suppression is likely to cause the suppressed thoughts to become more intrusive.  
Whereas suppression of white-bear-thoughts is of little consequences to most 
people, other forms of suppression are not. Note that thought suppression not only can 
cause cognitive rebound (increased thought occurrence), they can also cause 
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emotional rebound in that previously suppressed and undesired feelings return in 
greater force. In everyday contexts, people often attempt to avoid thinking about 
thoughts that are full of unpleasant emotions, such as thoughts about a still-desired but 
failed relationship. However, as in suppressing neutral thoughts like white-bear 
thoughts, suppressing thoughts of a failed relationship also may not prevent the 
unwanted feelings from reoccurring. This idea is demonstrated by Wegner and Gold 
(1995) that participants who still desired their past relationships experienced 
significantly greater emotional arousal after suppressing thoughts about their 
ex-partners, in comparison to those who suppressed thoughts of The Statue of Liberty 
and those who expressed their thoughts about the ex-partners. These findings 
indicated that the act of suppressing can make the thought-related emotions more 
accessible.  
Likewise, in interpersonal relationships, secrecy has been shown to result in 
greater preoccupation and attraction for the person one is obsessed with. The studies 
conducted by Wegner, Lane, and Dimitri (1994) showed that secrecy in relationships, 
whether real relationships or secret crushes, may cause a long term cognitive 
preoccupation in the forms of experiencing intrusive thoughts about that person. 
Furthermore, in another innovative study, the participants who did footsies secretly 
were significantly more attracted to each other in comparison to those who did 
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footsies overtly and those who did not physically contact each other.  
This ironic rebound effect of suppression was demonstrated in several other 
domains. For example, a study conducted by Borton, Markowitz, and Dieterich (2005) 
demonstrated that attempts to suppress negative thoughts about the self resulted in 
lower state self-esteem and more negative moods. Suppressing thoughts may also 
affect the way people assess job applicants during selection process. For example, 
raters who suppressed stereotypic age-related thoughts evaluated older job applicants 
less favorably than raters who did not suppress such thoughts (Kulik, Perry, & 
Bourhis, 2000). Another study conducted by Macrae et al. (1994) revealed that 
suppressing stereotypic thoughts about skinheads caused perceivers to choose a seat 
further away from a seat that they believed was occupied by a skinhead. These 
experiments revealed that thought suppression not only increases the likelihood of 
re-occurrence of the suppressed thoughts, but also affects the suppressors’ state 
self-esteem, judgments, and behaviors related to the construct being suppressed.  
Just as suppression of a thought or emotion can result in more frequent 
occurrence of the same thought or stronger emotion, suppression of an attitude-related 
thought may also result in a stronger attitude. However, this possibility was never 
examined. The study that comes closest to testing this issue is one study relating trait 
suppression tendency and chronic attitude certainty by Wenzlaff, Rude, and West 
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(2002). This study revealed formally-depressed participants tended to be significantly 
less certain of their adaptive attitudes than never-depressed participants. More 
interestingly, this chronic attitude uncertainty was positively correlated with their 
tendency to suppress their thoughts. However, this study used correlational data and 
did not directly examine the hypothesis concerning the effect of suppression on 
attitude strength. Therefore, the causal relationship between suppression and attitude 
strength remains unclear. In addition, what kind of information was being suppressed 
was indeterminate in this study. It is crucial to examine the effect of suppressing a 
specific attitude relevant content with appropriate experimental manipulation, in order 
to confirm the causal relationship between suppression and attitude strength.  
In sum, although both suppression and attitude have been demonstrated in 
separate lines of research as consequential in many areas of life, research that 
investigates the effect of suppression on attitude strength is still lacking. Therefore, 
the objective of this thesis is to examine the effects of experimentally manipulated 
thought suppression on attitude strength.  
Attitude Strength 
The study of attitude has a long research history. Way back in the late 1800s, the 
effect of the “state of preparedness” had been demonstrated in several studies 
concerning perception and memory. Particularly, in 1888, Lange discovered that 
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participants who were told to press a button upon receiving a signal were able to 
respond faster than those who were instructed to focus on the signal itself (cf. Kiesler, 
Collins, & Miller, 1969; Fazio & Petty, 2008). This “state of preparedness” was called 
task-attitude, which suggests that the attitude towards performing a task is related to 
task performance. In the 1900s, psychologists and sociologists interested in individual 
differences found attitude a useful construct in explicating individual differences 
across different contexts. One of the most famous and influential work was completed 
by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918, 1927) who posited the concept of attitude as a 
crucial variable in understanding social change among Polish peasants. A crucial 
development came with Allport (1935), who made one of the most famous 
proclamation in the history of social psychology when he claimed that attitude is “the 
most distinctive and indispensable concept in American social psychology”. Along 
with Thurstone’s (1928) statement that attitude can be measured, attitude was further 
established as an important construct.  
A simple definition of attitude is endorsed here—attitude is defined as the 
subjective evaluation of the favorability of an attitude object. This attitude object 
could be the self, another individual, a member of a social group, an event, an issue, 
an idea, or an action. The idea of favorability can be captured in dimensions such as 
favorable-unfavorable, good-bad, like-dislike, and harmful-beneficial (for review, see 
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Ajzen, 2001; e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000).  
This favorability towards an attitude object is regarded as the valence of 
evaluation, which is also perceived as the content of an attitude, ranging from very 
negative to very positive in an attitude continuum. Another important attitude 
parameter is attitude strength, which refers to the weight or intensity of an attitude 
that ranges from zero weight to a larger weight. For instance, it is possible for a 
person to hold a moderate position on a political issue and give strong weight to  
his/her position, while another person is rather favorable towards it but does not give 
as much weight to his/her favorability. The current research focused on the weight 
component, which is termed in the literature as attitude strength.  
Attitude strength has been regarded as more important than simple favorability 
as a predictor of many criterion variables such as overt behavior (e.g., Peterson & 
Dutton, 1973). Literally, it has been suggested that the predictive power of attitude 
measures would be lowered if attitude strength is neglected and that such neglect is a 
reason of attitude-behavior inconsistency observed in some studies (e.g., Peterson & 
Dutton, 1975; Sample & Warland, 1973). Despite its importance, there is no single 
definition of attitude strength that is widely endorsed. Instead, different researchers 
had defined and measured attitude strength using dimensions such as intensity 
(Schuman & Presser, 1981), direct experience (Regan & Fazio, 1977; Fazio & Zanna, 
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1981), affective-cognitive consistency (Rosenberg, 1956, 1968), certainty (Sample & 
Warland, 1973), importance (Borgida & Howard-Pitney, 1983; Fine, 1957), 
accessibility (Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983), and vested interest (Sivacek & Crano, 
1982).  
Many attitude studies investigating the relationships between these attitude 
dimensions found only low-to-moderate correlations (e.g., Allport & Hartman, 1925; 
Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993), suggesting that these 
dimensions are diverse and not redundant. Because these different strength 
dimensions also have different empirical consequences (Pomerantz, Chaiken, & 
Tordesillas, 1995), whether the rebound effect of thought suppression would manifest 
differently on these different attitude strength dimensions is still under-examined. In 
other words, it is unclear that whether suppressing thoughts could affect attitude 
strength only in some attitude strength dimensions but not others. However, note that 
although some dimensions might be poorly associated with other dimensions, most of 
these attitude strength dimensions have been shown to associate with the four aspects 
of strength features (i.e., durable, resistant to change, impactful on information 
processing and behavior) and on the surface seem to share some similarities (Krosnick 
et al., 1993). For example, according to Krosnick et al. (1993), extremity and latitudes 
of rejection and noncommitment are the property of attitude per se, importance and 
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certainty involve individuals’ subjective evaluations about their attitudes, direct 
behavioral experience concerns overt behavioral manifestations and behavioral 
histories, and accessibility denotes the associations between an attitude object and its 
evaluative judgments in memory.  
In the current studies, to investigate the effect of suppression on different 
dimensions of attitude strength, attitude strength is operationalized as attitude 
certainty (Study 1), behavioral manifestations (Study 2), and automatic attitude (Study 
3). Attitude certainty is commonly defined as the level of confidence an individual 
possesses on whether or not the attitude he/she advocates is correct (Budd, 1986; 
Krosnick & Schuman, 1988). Behavioral manifestation is a direct behavioral measure 
that assesses the likelihood or inclination to performing an attitude-congruent 
behavior. According to Krosnick and Petty (1994), attitude-congruent behavior is 
indicative of strong attitude. Lastly, automatic attitude is based on the strength of 
association between an attitude object and the evaluation of that object stored in 
memory (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). I now review each 
dimension in more details.  
Attitude Certainty. The use of certainty as a property of attitude can be traced 
back to Suchman’s study (1950) which investigated the relationship between attitude 
direction and certainty. In this study, certainty was viewed as a measure of attitude 
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intensity. This dimension of attitude strength is also viewed as having its ground on 
the “impression of confidence” about an attitude (Bassili, 1996), and the convictions 
one has about his/her beliefs or attitudes (Abelson, 1988). This suggests that attitude 
certainty involves meta-cognition (Rucker & Petty, 2004), which refers to the 
evaluations and thoughts about an attitude. Generally, attitude certainty can be 
conceptualized as the degree to which one is confident that his/her attitude is correct 
(Krosnick & Smith, 1994).  
Attitude certainty has gained importance in attitude research in part because it 
can be an important moderator in attitude-bahavior relationships (Fazio & Zanna, 
1978; Sample & Warland, 1973). The relationship between attitude and behavior 
tends to be stronger when people are more certain of their attitudes (Fazio & Zanna, 
1978). In a study, Rucker and Petty (2004) found that when consumers were certain of 
their attitudes, they also reported greater buying intention which was consistent with 
their attitude. Besides, with higher attitude certainty, attitudes are also more durable 
and more resistant to change (Bassili, 1996). On the other hand, as the consequences 
of attitude certainty have been identified in many studies, several antecedents were 
also examined, such as perceived social support (Festinger, 1954), direct versus 
indirect experience (Fazio & Zanna, 1978), and repeated expression (Holland, 
Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 2003). Nonetheless, whether attitude certainty can 
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also be affected by thought suppression was never directly examined before. 
Therefore, the current study could contribute to the literature by examining the 
hypothesis that suppressing attitude-related thought can strengthen the associated 
attitude certainty.  
Behavioral Manifestations. Although attitude can simply be conceptualized as 
evaluative dispositions to an attitude object, researchers have proposed that an attitude 
can be expressed by responding to stimulus in three different ways: through cognition, 
emotion, and behavior. According to Zanna and Rempel (2008), these three categories 
of information constitute the foundations in generating evaluations towards an attitude 
object. In particular, behavioral information includes past behavioral experiences and 
behavioral intentions. Whereas researchers such as Nigel Lemon (1973) explicated 
that the behavior component can be perceived as behavioral intentions or actual 
behaviors which can be the consequences of the cognitive and affective components, 
other researchers (e.g., Bem, 1972) proposed that past behaviors reflects a person’s 
attitude. In fact, “direct experience” is construed as one of the attitude strength 
dimensions that can indicate attitude intensity (Raden, 1985; Regan & Fazio, 1977). 
After all, without a doubt, behavior should be valid as one of the representations of 
attitude. Specifically, attitude should also be reflected by behavioral manifestations 
either in the form of behavioral experiences, behavioral intentions or actual behaviors. 
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In fact, strong attitudes are more predictive of behaviors (Fazio & Zanna, 1978) and 
are more impactful on behaviors (Krosnick et al., 1993; Krosnick & Petty, 1994) as 
compared to weak attitudes. In other words, behavior manifestation could be an 
effective indicator of attitude strength.  
Besides being conceived as serving a “knowledge” function that provides a 
reference framework that assists individuals to evaluate their environments, attitude 
was also perceived as serving a utilitarian adaptive function (cf. Lemon, 1973). This 
means attitude objects that aid individuals to fulfill their needs and goals are evaluated 
as favorable, whereas those that impede their goal fulfillments or value achievements 
are assessed as unfavorable. According to this view, attitude has instrumental function 
and is related to goal satisfaction. This construal of attitude formation and attitude 
change can also imply that attitude carries behavioral orientation. This in turn 
provides a solid background that behavior is the outward expression of attitude. This 
view is in agreement with the notion that strong attitude is consequential (Pomerantz 
et al., 1995) and the findings that attitude can predict behavior (e.g., Macrae et al., 
1994). On the other hand, attitude is also proposed to have approach-avoidance 
function (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997). Therefore, it is more likely that 
strong rather than weak attitude can facilitate the fight or flight behavioral decision. In 
the current study, suppressing attitude related thoughts is proposed to result in 
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stronger attitude. As behavior is a kind of explicit expression of attitude, I hypothesize 
that the strengthened attitude ensuing from thought suppression should also be 
exhibited by increased likelihood to perform attitude-congruent behaviors. In other 
words, the stronger attitude should also be associated with enhanced inclination to 
approach attitude objects which are perceived as favorable and could facilitate goal 
fulfillment, or associated with increased tendency to avoid attitude objects that are 
deemed unfavorable and could impede value achievements.  
Automatic Attitudes. Automatic attitude refers to an attitude that can be 
automatically activated from memory upon encountering the attitude object, and is 
characterized as having strong association between the attitude and attitude object 
stored in memory (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986). According to Fazio 
(1986, 1989, 1990, 2001), an attitude object and its associated evaluations are linked 
together with different strength in memory. This strength of association determines 
attitude accessibility, which influences the ease and speed to retrieve attitudinal 
information from memory. The stronger the strength of associations between the 
object and its evaluations, the more accessible the attitude is. Only strong attitude 
which is highly accessible could be immediately activated upon mere presentation of 
an attitude object, whereas weak attitude can only be retrieved through an effortful 
and conscious process.  
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The sequential priming task, an implicit and unobtrusive measure of attitude 
strength, is based on this notion of association strength (Fazio, 1990, 2001). The 
assumption underlying this procedure is that the presentation of an attitude object (in 
the form of a prime) automatically activates the evaluation linked to the object, and 
thus influences the responding speed to a subsequently presented target word, usually 
an adjective which is evaluatively congruent or incongruent with the attitude prime. 
The response latency would be shorter for the target adjectives that have the same 
valence as the attitude prime, and longer for the adjectives that have the opposite 
valence. In other words, the activated evaluations facilitate the responses to the 
subsequent evaluatively congruent target adjectives whereas inhibit the responses to 
the following evaluatively incongruent adjectives. The response latencies should 
reflect the strength of associations between the attitude object (i.e., the prime) and the 
associated evaluations. In other words, shorter response latencies mean stronger 
association, which denote higher attitude accessibility; whereas larger response 
latencies indicate weaker association and therefore lower attitude accessibility. The 
sequential priming task was adapted by Fazio and colleagues (1986) from the 
sequential semantic priming paradigm by Neely (1977), and has been employed as an 
implicit measure of attitude strength in various contexts, including goal-related 
behavior (Ferguson, 2007), attitudes (Fazio, Sabonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986), 
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and text processing (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980).  
The sequential priming task is an implicit (or indirect) measure because it relies 
on automatic information processing and does not require conscious evaluation of the 
primes, unlike an explicit measure which requires people to consciously and actively 
retrieve attitude relevant information from memory. In other words, this priming 
procedure can gauge automatic evaluations in response to the primes at situations 
where the respondents are unaware of the true purpose of the task, or may not have 
full effortful control over their responses. Many studies investigating racial attitude 
have demonstrated that the estimate of negative racial attitude in the priming measure 
was correlated with behaviors and judgments that are congruent with the activated 
attitudes. For example, the degree of friendliness towards a black confederate was 
correlated with racial attitude measured by the priming procedure (Dovidio, 
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Besides, Jackson (1997) also found that participants 
who demonstrated more negative attitudes towards African Americans in the priming 
measure tended to judge an essay purportedly written by an African American 
undergraduate less favorably. These findings showed that the priming procedure is 
effective in revealing automatically activated evaluations that possess satisfactory 
predictive validity. A more relevant study is conducted on heavy cigarette smokers by 
Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Rose, and Koch (2002). This study revealed that greater 
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manipulated deprivation caused the smokers to have higher positivity towards 
cigarette-related photos. This finding can also imply that suppression also played a 
role in the deprivation and therefore ironically increased the positivity towards 
cigarette-related objects. In essence, this priming measure can be employed to capture 
the automatically activated evaluation about thinness in the current study. As I 
propose that thought suppression should cause stronger thought-associated attitude, 
the suppressors should demonstrate greater accessibility of positivity towards thinness 
than the non-suppressors.  
Suppression and Attitude Strength 
Attitude strength is known to change depending on various contextual factors, 
such as minority versus majority influence, social consensus, dissonance, affect, and 
mere exposure (for review, see Ajzen, 2001; Crano & Prislin, 2006). However, it 
remains untested whether suppression also serves as one of the antecedents of attitude 
strength. When a person tries to inhibit a thought, for instance, a thought about the 
positive aspects of being thin, the autonomic monitoring process is initiated to 
constantly search for this prohibited information to achieve the desired mind state. It 
is likely that in this searching process, the associations between “being thin” and its 
positive attributes like “beautiful” and “healthy” are repeatedly activated and 
therefore strengthened. As a result, the positive attributes of thinness are made more 
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available and become more pronounced. This rebound effect may not only manifest in 
thought occurrences but also in other components of attitude such as emotion and 
behavior, as would be predicted by the associative network model (Anderson, 1976). 
Therefore, as thoughts and emotions are both activated and intensified due to the 
spreading activation, attitude may also be strengthened.  
The Current Research 
I examined the main hypothesis using thinness as the attitude object. Specifically, 
I tested the prediction that suppressing positive thoughts about thinness is likely to 
strengthen the positive attitude towards thinness. In many societies, thinness is valued 
or even glorified. However, suppression is still likely in the circumstances where 
individuals need to temporarily suppress or conceal their true attitudes about being 
thin as to interact courteously with fat people or with people with different views in 
social contexts. At times, people might even be unaware of their act of thought 
suppression. Since attitude and thought suppression are both commonly seen, the 
examination on whether or not the occasional thought suppression would intensify the 
associated attitude can provide insights into the literature of attitude change.  
It is important to note that the youths nowadays generally hold positive attitudes 
towards thinness and negative attitudes towards fatness. This was shown in previous 
studies which found that participants associated thinness with positive aspects and 
23 
fatness with negative aspects in implicit attitude measures (Ahern & Hetherington, 
2006; Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2005).  
I examined this issue in three studies, each using a different dimension of attitude 
strength. Particularly, I propose that attitude strength is a function of thought 
suppression. Attitude strength was operationalized as attitude certainty in Study 1, two 
behavioral manifestations in Study 2, and automatic attitude in Study 3. In all cases, I 
predicted that suppressing positive thoughts of thinness should strengthen the 
associated attitudes.  
The same suppression manipulation is adopted across all three studies. This 
manipulation procedure is adopted from Macrae et al.’s (1994) study about 
suppressing stereotypic thoughts. In this study, the participants were instructed to give 
descriptions of skinheads, but those who were induced to suppress skinhead 
stereotypes were instructed not to mention any stereotypic information about the 
skinheads. Similarly, in the three experiments in this paper, participants were told to 
describe their thoughts about thinness but those in the Suppression condition were 
told not to mention any of their positive views about thinness. Other participants 
(those in the Expression Control condition) received the same instructions but were 
encouraged to express their positive views of thinness. For all three studies, I 
predicted that participants in the Suppression condition should show stronger positive 
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attitude towards thinness in the post-suppression phase than those in the Expression 
Control condition.   
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STUDY 1: ATTITUDE CERTAINTY 
In this study, attitude strength was operationalized as attitude certainty. The main 
hypothesis is that suppressing attitude-related thoughts should strengthen the 
associated attitude certainty. Since thinness is generally seen by Singaporean youths 
as something desirable to have while research evidences have also shown that people 
nowadays generally regard thinness as good (e.g., Ahern & Hetherington, 2006; 
Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2005), the participants were assumed to hold positive 
attitudes towards thinness. Therefore, in this study, the participants in Suppression 
condition were asked not to mention any positive aspects of being thin, whereas those 
in Expression Control condition were encouraged to freely express the positive 
aspects of being thin. It was expected that participants who suppressed their 
attitude-related thoughts should feel more certain of their positive attitudes towards 
thinness as compared to the participants who expressed the same thoughts.  
Furthermore, since weight is closely related to the issue of being thin, the 
participants were also asked to report their current weight and these reported weights 
were compared with their measured weights in order to examine whether suppressing 
positive thoughts about being thin affected the participants’ subjective reports of their 
weights. The resulting indicator reflects weight judgment accuracy. Previous studies 
showed that attitude could affect information processing (Fazio, 1989; Fazio, Powell, 
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& Herr, 1983). It is possible that suppressing positive thoughts towards thinness 
increased accessibility of positivity towards thinness, which in turn biased participants’ 
judgments about their weight. This discrepancy was therefore used as an indirect 
indicator of attitude strength. It was predicted that suppressing positive thoughts of 
thinness should result in a greater discrepancy between the reported and measured 
weights. More importantly, the participants who suppressed their positive thoughts 
about thinness should report weights lower than their actual weights. On the other 
hand, participants who expressed their positive thoughts about thinness should report 
weights that are closer to their true weights, leading to a smaller actual-reported 
weight discrepancy.  
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Sixty NUS undergraduates (50 female, 10 male; mean age = 19.62, SD = 1.20) 
participated in this study for course credit. Each subject was randomly assigned to one 
of two Thought conditions: Suppression condition and Expression Control condition. 
Specifically, 30 participants were assigned to each Thought condition, in which 25 
were females and 5 were males.  
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Procedure and Materials 
As a cover story, this study was titled “Cognition and Perception of Life Events”, 
and participants were told that this study aimed to explore the effects of thinking 
about everyday life events on people’s cognitive and perceptual abilities. The same 
title was used for the other studies in this thesis in recruiting participants.  
Upon arrival, each participant was greeted and seated at individual cubicles 
separated by partitions. First, they were asked to complete a description task (see 
Appendix A) which in fact was the manipulation task to induce suppression or 
expression. In this task, as part of the general instructions, all participants were 
instructed to ponder on issues pertaining to being thin and to describe their thoughts in 
about one paragraph. From this point, the participants in each condition received 
different instructions. Those in the Suppression condition were instructed not to think 
about and not to describe any positive aspects of being thin, whereas those in the 
Expression Control condition were encouraged to think about and express their 
positive thoughts on being thin.  
After this manipulation, they answered a set of questions that contained attitude 
certainty measures (see Appendix D), demographic information, and a survey 
inquiring their opinions about the purpose of this study (see Appendix C). Specifically, 
three items measured attitude certainty towards being thin. Participants reported how 
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certain they were towards being thin by indicating their responses on the three 
9-Likert scale items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much): “How certain are you 
about (meaning how strongly do you believe in) your beliefs about being thin?”, 
“How sure are you about your beliefs regarding being thin?”, and “How confident are 
you about your beliefs regarding being thin?”. The first item was adapted from a 
study conducted by Henderson, de Liver, and Gollwitzer (2008), and the second and 
third item were adapted from a study by Pomerantz et al. (1995). Besides, participants 
also reported what they thought was their height (in cm) and weight (in kg). Lastly, 
they indicated what they thought was the purpose of this study on an open-ended 
question: “What do you think is the purpose of this study?”. After this, their actual 
weight and height were measured, and then they were thanked, debriefed, and 
dismissed.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check and Debriefing. Analyses of the responses to the debriefing 
question indicated that no participant knew the true purpose of the study and no one 
figured out the relation between the description task and the follow-up questionnaire. 
Two independent raters who were blind to the experimental conditions coded the 
passages obtained from the description task on whether the participants completely 
followed their respective instructions as given according to their assigned Thought 
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condition. That is, the raters coded whether participants in the Suppression condition 
avoided mentioning positive aspects about thinness as they were instructed to and 
whether those in the Expression Control condition mentioned positive aspects of 
thinness as they were instructed to. Inter-rater agreement was high as the raters agreed 
on more than 83.3% of the descriptions. All disagreements were resolved between the 
two raters and the final scores indicated that 90.0% of those in the Suppression 
condition avoided mentioning positive aspects of thinness, 96.7% of those in the 
Expression Control condition mentioned positive aspects of thinness.  
 
Figure 1: Attitude Certainty towards thinness as a function of the Suppression 
and Expression Control conditions.  
Attitude Certainty. Reliability analysis of the three attitude certainty items 
showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .928), and a factor analysis on 
them demonstrated a one-factor structure that accounted for 88.001% of variances. 
Therefore, scores of the three items were averaged to compose an attitude certainty 













M = 6.16, SD = 1.42, and this averaged score was significantly higher than the 
midpoint of 5, t (54) = 6.07, p < .001. A linear regression analysis was performed 
between the attitude certainty index as dependent variable and the Thought conditions 
(the Suppression condition was coded as 1 whereas the Expression Control condition 
was coded as -1) as independent variable. Hence, this regression analysis was in effect 
also a contrast analyses in which the predictor was constructed to test the hypothesis 
that the Suppression condition should show higher attitude certainty scores than the 
Expression Control condition. Thought significantly predicted attitude certainty, R2 
= .13, F (1, 53) = 7.94, p = .007. More importantly, the mean certainty of the 
Suppression condition was significantly higher than that of the Expression Control 
condition, t (53) = 2.82, p = .007, b = .51, SE = .18, indicating that participants who 
suppressed their positive thoughts of being thin then reported higher levels of 
certainty with regard to their attitudes towards thinness than the participants who 
expressed the same thoughts (see Figure 1). This result also provided evidence for the 
main hypothesis that suppressing attitude related thoughts should strengthen the 
corresponding attitude.  
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Figure 2: Actual-Reported Weight was affected by the Suppression and 
Expression Control conditions.  
Actual-reported Weight Discrepancy. Next, I examined the discrepancy between 
reported and measured weights. Participants’ reported weights were deducted from 
their actual weights to yield an actual-reported weight discrepancy indicator. This 
discrepancy indicator should reflect weight judgment accuracy and could demonstrate 
whether the participants’ subjective judgment of their weight was affected by the 
manipulation. This indicator was then submitted to a linear regression analysis as 
dependent variable with Thought (using the same coded variable mentioned earlier) as 
the predictor variable. This discrepancy indicator was significantly predicted by 
Thought, R2 = .07, F (1, 53) = 4.24, p = .04. The analysis revealed that the 
actual-reported weight discrepancy was significantly greater in the Suppression 
condition (M = 0.79, SE = 1.53) than in the Expression Control condition (M = 0.03, 
SE = 1.16), t (53) = 2.06, p = .04, b = .38, SE = .18. Also, this discrepancy was 














was not different from zero in the Expression Control condition, t (26) = .13, p = .896. 
Further t-tests revealed that the actual weight, t (53) =.64, p = .52 and reported weight, 
t (53) = .44, p = .64, respectively, did not differ between the two conditions. Taken 
together, these results showed that participants who suppressed their positive thoughts 
of thinness were inclined to report weights lighter than their actual weights, while 
those who expressed their positive thoughts of thinness tended to report relatively 
more accurate weights (see Figure 2). Furthermore, it seems unlikely that this 
discrepancy was caused by the actual weight differences or reported weight 
differences between the participants in the two conditions as evidenced by the 
non-significant results in weight analyses. Rather, these results seem to imply that 
thought suppression strengthened the positive attitudes towards thinness, compelling 
the individuals to report weights lower than their actual weight, a judgmental bias 
which appears congruent with their stronger positive attitudes towards thinness.  
It is possible that participants in the Suppression condition exhibit a form of 
distorted self-perceptions of their true weights (as a result of prior thought 
suppression), causing an unintentional downward reporting of their weights. This 
might due to an enhanced attitude accessibility of the positive information about 
thinness due to the prior suppression manipulation which in turn affected information 
processing and biased the weight judgment (Fazio, 1989; Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 
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1983). In fact, this finding is consistent with the notion that stronger attitude carries 
more effect on information processing (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & 
Carnot, 1993). However, it is also possible that in order to present themselves 
positively to others, these participants chose to report weights that were lower as they 
became more certain of the positive aspects about being thin. The current research is 
unable to examine which of these two possibilities is valid. In any case, it appears that 
suppressing positive thoughts about being thin can strengthen the thought-related 
attitude.  
Summary. Attitude certainty can be viewed as a type of explicit measure of 
attitude strength because it requires the participants to be motivated and capable to 
accurately report their attitudes. Responses to such self-report measures are 
vulnerable to demand characteristics. Although one can argue that the discrepancy 
between reported and measured weights might have gauged unconscious responses 
that were affected by the act of thought suppression, the self-report measure of 
perceived weight still involved cognitive deliberation, subjectivity, and knowledge 
about the weights, therefore the possibility of demand characteristics could not be 
eliminated.  
Despite the above consideration, behavior is always perceived as indicative of 
strong attitude. Attitude not only can guide behavior, but also can facilitate fight or 
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flight decision. Unlike self-report measures which are vulnerable to numerous 
measuring deficits that may compromise the validity of the results, behavior measure 
as an indirect measure is believed to more accurately reflect the respondent’s true 
attitude. That is, a person may indicate on an item that he/she is not on diet, but the 
fact that he/she refrains from food regularly may reflect that his/her positive attitude 
towards being thin is strong. Furthermore, when the individuals were unaware of 
experimenter’s expectation, nor the relation between their behaviors and other 
measures in the study, they would have little grounds to modify their responses. 
Therefore, behavior manifestation could indicate one’s true attitude which self-report 
measures might not reveal.  
In addition, attitude certainty is more about the cognitive aspect of attitude 
strength. An attitude also comprises behavioral elements. Therefore, if suppressing 
attitude-related thoughts can intensify an attitude, this stronger attitude should also be 
reflected in behaviors. Therefore, two behavior indicators were utilized in the next 
study as to test the hypothesis that the strengthened attitude ensuing from thought 
suppression should increase the inclination to behave in line with the attitude.  
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STUDY 2: BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS 
Behavior is often regarded as one of the outward expressions of attitude, and thus 
the likelihood to perform a particular attitude related behavior can be taken as an 
indicator of attitude strength (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Kronsnick, et al., 1993). 
Generally, strong attitude should have stronger predictive power of attitude-related 
behaviors (e.g., Fazio et al., 1982). Specifically, I expected participants who 
suppressed their positive thoughts about thinness should exhibit stronger tendencies to 
perform behaviors that are congruent with the attitude than those who expressed the 
same thoughts. Two behavioral indicators were used and both are based on the 
assumption that holding stronger positive attitude towards thinness should be 
associated with higher likelihood of enacting behaviors that are congruent with the 
attitude. In one indicator, participants were asked in a bogus reading comprehension 
task to select a passage to read out of several options. The target passage was one 
concerning staying fit. I hypothesized that those in the Suppression condition should 
be more likely to choose this passage than those in the Expression Control condition. 
In the other behavior indicator, participants were told that they would be entered into 
a lucky draw contest of which the winner will get a voucher from one of two 
restaurants. They were asked to pick which of the restaurant they would prefer getting 
their voucher from should they win the contest. The two restaurants proposed were 
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popular restaurants that are familiar to Singaporean youths. The prices of the food 
offered by both restaurants are similar and are affordable to the participants. Therefore, 
both restaurants are comparable choices for the food voucher measure in current 
research. To protect the commercial interest of both restaurants, their identities were 
not revealed and also only represented as Restaurant A and Restaurant B.  
In order to survey the participants’ opinions about their preferences and 
healthiness of food offered by these two restaurants, an email questionnaire was sent 
to the participants seven days after they completed the main tasks in lab. This survey 
was not conducted during the lab session because the participants’ responses could be 
affected by the manipulation. Besides, this survey was also not conducted before the 
lab session as to rule out the possibility that the participants might suspect the purpose 
of the lucky draw contest in which case their choices to food voucher would be 
influenced. The email was only sent on the seventh day after the lab session because 
no existing study showed that the rebound effect of experimentally manipulated 
thought suppression can persist more than one week, and thus should not affect their 
responses to these control items.  
Method 
Subjects and design 
Twenty-seven NUS undergraduates (21 female, 6 Male, mean age = 20.48, SD = 
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1.48) participated in this study in exchange for course credit. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two Thought conditions as in the previous study; 9 
females and 4 males were assigned to the Suppression condition, and 12 females and 
2 males were assigned to the Expression Control condition.  
Procedure and Materials 
Upon arrival, each participant was greeted and seated at individual cubicles with 
a computer. As in the previous study, participants were subjected to the same 
description task (all aspects of the task are the same as those described in Study 1, see 
Appendix A). After this manipulation session, all participants were asked to complete 
a computerized task. Specifically, they were told that they would have to complete an 
English comprehension task. They were told they had to read one passage out of five 
passage-options, and then answer some simple questions later. They were told that all 
five passages were extracted from famous local magazines that are well-known to 
undergraduates. They were told that they would be given a passage of their preference 
and then were asked to rank the five passages according to their degree of interest. 
They were told that the experimenter will try to assign them their most preferred 
passage according to these rankings. Besides, they were told that the exact title of the 
passages would not be shown directly, but instead they would need to base their 
rankings on a short description of the content of the passages. The passages were 
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presented as “passage about study skills”, “passage about driving skills”, “passage 
about social relationships”, “passage about physical fitness”, and “passage about 
investments”. They were instructed that 1 was to be rated for the topic they were most 
interested in and would like to take as their first choice, 2 for the topic that they would 
like to take as their second choice, and so on. Thereafter, the participants were 
prompted to a page stating that the passage preparation was in process, and were 
informed of a lucky draw contest. They were told that in order to express the 
experimenter’s appreciation for their participation in the experiment, they were to be 
entered into a lucky draw where the winner would receive a SG$10 food voucher 
from one of two restaurants. They were asked to indicate their choice of which 
restaurant they would like to have their food voucher from. The names of the two 
restaurants were then presented. These restaurants were famous restaurants that all 
participants recognized. Also, one of them (Restaurant A) has the reputation of 
producing healthier food than the other (Restaurant B). However, to protect the 
commercial interest of these restaurants, I cannot reveal their identities. After the 
participants made their pick, they were told that the lucky draw should involve all 
participants who participated in this study, thus would be conducted after the data 
collection was completed. Thereafter, they filled up a questionnaire asking for 
demographic information and answered an open-ended question concerning their 
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knowledge or speculations about the purpose of this study (the same debriefing item 
as used in Study 1, see Appendix C). Finally, they were reminded to respond to a brief 
questionnaire that would be sent to them via email seven days after their participation 
in the lab session. Then, they were thanked and dismissed.  
After seven days, the participants were sent an email with a questionnaire 
attachment (see Appendix E) that contained five items. They responded to four items 
on their preferences and perceptions of the food offered by the two restaurants. 
Particularly, they rated “Please rate the degree to which you like the food offered by 
Restaurant A/ Restaurant B” on a seven-point scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). They also rated “Please rate the degree of healthiness of the food offered 
by Restaurant A/ Restaurant B” on a seven-point scale that ranged from 1 (not at all 
healthy) to 7 (very healthy). The last question (the same debriefing question) 
investigated whether the participants knew the purpose of this study.  
 After receiving all completed questionnaires, a debrief email explicating the 
purpose and design of this study was sent to all participants. At the same time, a lucky 
draw was conducted, and the winner was then notified and awarded the S$10 voucher.  
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation Check and Debriefing. The email questionnaires were sent on the 
seventh day to all participants, and the completed questionnaires were received within 
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eight days after the emails were sent. No participant knew the true purpose of this 
study and they were also unaware of the relationship between the manipulation 
description task and all tasks that followed. As in Study 1, two independent raters 
coded the passages on whether the participants followed their respective instructions 
with regard to whether they avoided mentioning or mentioned positive aspects of 
thinness. The inter-rater agreement was satisfactory, with 74.1% of agreement 
between the raters on the description. All disagreements were resolved between the 
two raters and the final scores indicated that 92.3% of those in the Suppression 
condition avoided mentioning positive aspects of thinness, 100% of those in the 
Expression condition mentioned positive aspects of thinness.  
 
Figure 3: Food voucher choice as a function of the Suppression and Expression 
Control conditions.  
 Food Voucher Choice. Two repeated-measures ANOVA were conducted 
separately to test whether the participants’ ratings on restaurant preferences and 
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two restaurants. Results showed that participants perceived the food offered by 
Restaurant A (M = 4.81, SD = .83) as healthier than the food offered by Restaurant B 
(M = 2.63, SD = 1.15), F (1, 25) = 117.56, p < .001, η = .83, but they equally liked the 
food offered by both restaurants (Restaurant A: M = 4.63, SD = 1.82; Restaurant B: M 
= 4.67, SD = 1.33), F (1, 25) = .004, p = .95, η < .001. This is evidence supporting my 
expectations that Singaporean youths generally see Restaurant A as offering healthier 
food than Restaurant B. Thought did not predict Perceived Healthiness and Restaurant 
Preference of both restaurants, F (1, 25) = .072, p = .79, η = .003 for Perceived 
Healthiness and F (1, 25) = 3.18, p = .087, η = .113 for Restaurant Preference, 
respectively. These results validated the utilization of food voucher choice as a 
behavioral indicator as participants unequivocally agreed that Restaurant A offered 
healthier food than Restaurant B while having comparable preferences to the food 
offered by both restaurants. Note that these variables were assessed a week after the 
Thought manipulation and were unlikely to be affected by them. They are therefore 
likely to reflect participants’ actual perception of the two restaurants.  
A binary logistic regression was conducted with Restaurant Preference as 
dependent variable and Thought as independent variable. The dependent variable, 
Restaurant Preference, was expressed as a binary variable in which selection of 
Restaurant A was coded as 1 and selection of restaurant B was coded as 0. Thought 
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(coded in the same way in Study 1) significantly predicted Restaurant Preference, as 
the likelihood test for the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 27) = 8.80, p = .003. The 
Wald test showed that Restaurant Preference was significantly and positively 
predicted by Thought, χ2 (1, N = 27) = 7.31, p = .007, b = 1.25, SE = .46. In particular, 
76.9% of the participants (10 out of 13) in the Suppression condition chose Restaurant 
A, and only 21.4% of those (3 out of 14) in the Expression Control condition chose 
Restaurant A (see Figure 3). This demonstrated that the participants who suppressed 
their thoughts were more inclined to choose the food voucher from a restaurant (i.e., 
Restaurant A) that they perceived to offer healthier food as compared to those who 
expressed the same thoughts. These results corresponded with the main prediction in 
that thought suppression should result in stronger positive attitudes towards thinness, 
and therefore should increase the tendency or inclination among the suppressors to 




Figure 4: Mean rank of passages as a function of the Suppression and 
Expression Control conditions.1  
Passage Choice. The dependent variable, Passage Choice, was coded in the 
following way: For each passage, a score of 1 was assigned if that passage was ranked 
as the top choice, a score of 2 was assigned if that passage was ranked as the second 
choice, and so on. A Mann-Whitney test was performed on the rank scores of each of 
the five passages with Thought as categorical independent variable. The sum-rank 
scores derived from the Mann-Whitney test are presented in Figure 4 (lower scores 
indicate stronger preference). The analyses revealed that participants in Suppression 
                                                 
1
 The Mean Ranks which ranged from 10 to 18 were derived from Mann-Whitley test but not the 
original mean rank scores which should range from 1 to 5. These mean rank scores were computed by 
dividing sum-rank scores of a condition by the number of participants in that condition. To compute a 
sum-rank for a condition, data (the original rank orders) for Suppression condition and Expression 
Control condition were first pooled and then ranked from the smallest to the largest. This produces rank 
numbers for each input (data). For the cases where the original rank orders were the same, the rank 
number was the averaged rank number for these cases. Then, the rank numbers for one condition were 



















condition ranked the physical fitness passage more highly than those in the 
Expression Control condition, U = 43.50, p = .016. However, there was no difference 
between the Suppression condition and the Expression Control condition in the 
ranked preferences for the study skills passage, U = 64.50, p = .16, the driving skills 
passage, U = 80.50, p = .59, the social relationships passage, U = 85.00, p = .74, and 
the financial investments passage, U = 61.00, p = .13. These results indicated that 
only responses to the “physical fitness” passage were affected by the Thought 
manipulation. Furthermore, for the physical fitness passage, the sum rank of 
Expression Control condition was reliably higher (M = 3.79, SE = .89) than that of 
Suppression condition (M = 2.85, SE = .90), indicating that the participants in the 
Suppression condition ranked the physical fitness passage as more preferable than the 
participants in the Expression Control condition. Consistent with the main hypothesis, 
this finding not only showed that thought suppression strengthened the 
thought-related attitude, but the strengthened attitude was also associated with 
stronger inclination and interest to seek for information relevant to that attitude.  
Lastly, the rank scores for the passage on physical fitness was negatively 
correlated with scores for Restaurant Preference, rs (27) = -.64, p < .001, indicating 
that those who ranked the physical fitness passage more preferably tended to prefer 
Restaurant A, a restaurant which was perceived as offering healthier food. On the 
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other hand, the correlations between the Restaurant Preference and the rank scores of 
the other passages were non-significant, rs (27) = .08, p = .68 for study skills, rs (27) 
= .24, p = .22 for driving skills, rs (27) = -.23, p = .26 for social relationships, and rs 
(27) = .08, p = .68 for investments. These results suggested a strong consistency 
between the two behaviors, and also revealed that the strengthened attitude ensued 
from thought suppression was associated with stronger tendency to behave in line 
with the attitude in various contexts and different ways. In particular, the stronger 
behavioral tendency was revealed in both inclinations to seek attitude-related 
information and to engage in attitude-congruent behavior.  
Summary. The findings suggested that strong attitude not only can cause 
cognitive rebound, as indicated by the more polarized reported attitude certainty, but 
also can cause behavioral rebound, as indicated by the greater inclination to obtain 
information about physical fitness and higher tendency to engage in health-promoting 
eating behavior. This also suggested some degree of consistency between the 
cognitive component and behavior component of attitude that are a consequence of 
thought suppression. In essence, the findings again validated the main hypothesis that 
suppressing attitude-related thoughts can strengthen the corresponding attitude. 
However, although the two behavioral indicators purportedly measured attitude 
strength rather indirectly, one common ground these behavioral measures might share 
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with direct measures like attitude certainty is they both involved conscious 
deliberation. Thus, the possibility that their choices were to some degree affected by 
reactance and demand characteristics still could not be eliminated. There was no way 
to figure out whether the participants who suppressed their positive thoughts about 
thinness would have made the choices to reinstate their positive stance about being 
thin which were prohibited of expression earlier. Besides, it was also probable that the 
participants suspected the experimenter’s expectation and unintentionally attempted to 
fulfill the anticipation. Therefore, in the next study, attitude strength was examined 
using a priming procedure which has been shown to measure automatic responses that 
are less susceptible to the influences of strategic responding.  
Although Studies 1 and 2 have shown that suppressing positive thoughts of 
thinness can cause ironic rebound, it is unclear whether suppressing negative thoughts 
of a negative attitude object would also produce similar results. As important as the 
attitude towards being thin, the thoughts like “I am fat” and “Fat is bad” may also 
haunt some people’s mind, and the circumstances that may evoke these thoughts and 
activate the related attitudes may be as commonplace as those that evokes thoughts 
about thinness. Therefore, “fatness” was examined together with “thinness” in Study 
3 so as to investigate whether attitude objects with opposite connotation would bring 
different or similar rebound effects.  
47 
Finally, it is unclear that whether expressing thoughts also have enhancing 
effects on attitude strength, as repeated attitude expression has been shown to increase 
attitude accessibility in some studies (e.g., Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). 
In addition, note that some suppression studies (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, 
Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990; Kelly & Kahn, 1994) used expression as the control 
condition (as in Studies 1 and 2), whereas other studies (e.g., Lane & Wegner, 1995; 
Wenzlaff et al., 1988) used a relatively simple control condition, in which participants 
were solely instructed to think of a certain issue and no further instructions were given. 
It is still unclear whether these two types of control conditions would produce 
different effects. Therefore, in the next study, a No-Instruction Control condition was 
included and was examined together with the Expression Control condition to 
investigate whether they would produce different or similar effects on attitude 




STUDY 3: AUTOMATIC ATTITUDES 
In this study, automatic attitudes towards two attitude objects, thinness and 
fatness, were examined. The same main hypothesis was also applied here, that is, 
participants who suppressed their positive thoughts about thinness (or negative 
thoughts about fatness) should demonstrate stronger positive attitudes towards 
thinness (or stronger negative attitudes towards fatness, respectively) as compared to 
their counterparts who did not suppress the same thoughts. The examination on both 
positive and negative attitude objects enabled the generalization of rebound effect of 
thought suppression on attitude strength from positive attitudes (as evidenced in Study 
1 and Study 2) to negative attitudes.  
Furthermore, two instead of one control condition, the Expression Control and 
No-Instruction Control conditions, were employed in this study. No prior prediction 
was made on how these two control conditions might affect attitude strength. It is 
possible that thought expression would result in weaker attitude due to unpriming 
effect which lead to thought deactivation (Sparrow & Wegner, 2006); it is also 
possible that thought expression would bring about stronger attitude as shown in 
previous studies (e.g., Fazio et al., 1982). As these two control conditions were 
utilized separately as control in previous studies, they were now both employed in the 
current study as to test for their influences of thinking on attitude strength.  
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Automatic attitude was measured as attitude accessibility, assessed by a 
sequential priming procedure adapted from Fazio et al. (1986). This procedure is 
adopted here because the possibility of reactance and demand characteristics could 
not be completely ruled out for Study 1 and Study 2, although the data supported the 
main hypothesis. On the other hand, the priming procedure is less susceptible to 
reactance and demand characteristics because this technique measures automatic 
responses instead of deliberative responses. Therefore, the findings with this priming 
procedure could further validate the main hypothesis that thought suppression could 
intensify the related attitude.  
Method 
Subjects and design 
Ninety-nine NUS undergraduates (68 female, 31 males, mean age = 20.35, SD = 
1.74) participated in this study for course credit. Two opposite attitude objects (i.e., 
thinness and fatness) were employed to test whether the predicted effects would occur 
in both. The same manipulations used in Studies 1 and 2 were adopted, except that a 
No-Instruction Control condition was added. Particularly, whereas in the Suppression 
condition the participants were asked to suppress their positive thoughts about 
thinness or suppress their negative thoughts about fatness, and in the Expression 
Control condition participants were encouraged to freely express their positive 
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thoughts on thinness or express their negative thoughts about fatness, the participants 
in No-Instruction Control condition were solely asked to write down their thoughts on 
being thin or being fat without further suppression or expression instructions. This 
resulted in a 2 (Attitude Objects: Thinness versus Fatness) × 3 (Thoughts: 
Suppression versus Expression Control versus No-Instruction Control) 
between-participants factorial design. The participants were randomly assigned to one 
of these six conditions. Sixteen participants were assigned to all conditions except for 
Fatness-Expression Control condition which had 17 participants.  
Procedure and Materials 
 As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were greeted and seated at individual cubicles 
with a computer. Participants first performed the same description task as in Studies 1 
and 2 (see Appendix A and Appendix B). Particularly, participants in the Thinness 
conditions were subjected to exactly the same procedure used previously. All aspects 
of the procedure remained unchanged for the Suppression and Expression Control 
conditions. Those in the No-Instruction Control condition were given no further 
instructions after they were instructed to think about and describe the issue about 
thinness. Participants in the Fatness conditions were subjected to basically the same 
procedure with the exception that negative attitude towards fatness were examined. In 
other words, all participants in the Fatness conditions described their views of fatness, 
51 
but those in the Suppression condition were instructed not to mention any negative 
views about fatness, those in the Expression Control condition were encouraged to 
freely express such views, and those in the No-Instruction Control condition were 
given no further instructions. Thereafter, all completed the sequential priming task, 
which was designed to measure automatic attitudes towards thinness (for those in the 
Thinness conditions) or fatness (for those in the Fatness conditions).  
Participants were told that the purpose of the task was to examine how people 
categorize words. This task comprised 8 practice trials and 72 actual trials. The 
practice trials were designed to familiarize the participants with the procedure. They 
were told that on each trial they would see two words (first the prime word, then the 
target word) and that they had to respond as quickly as possible whether the target 
word was a good word or a bad word. In each trial, a “+” sign was first presented in 
the middle of the screen for 2000 ms, followed by a prime at the same location for 
150 ms, then followed by a blank screen presented for 150 ms, and lastly the target 
word. The target word would remain on the center of the screen until the participants 
pressed either M (to indicate that it is a bad word) or Z (to indicate that it is a good 
word) to categorize the word. The inter-trial interval was 2000 ms. Participants were 
told that the purpose of displaying the “+” sign was to focus their attention and to get 
them ready for the coming words. Also, they were instructed to respond to the second 
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word (the target word) as quickly as they can.  
 In practice trials, the prime words were control neutral words that were unrelated 
to the notion of “thin” or “fat” (i.e., chair, table, kite, cat, dog, skateboard, pencil, 
paper), whereas the target words included 4 positive adjectives (beautiful, excellent, 
marvelous, magnificent) and 4 negative adjectives (miserable, hideous, dreadful, 
painful). In each of the actual trial, the prime word was either the attitude prime or 
one of 14 neutral primes. “Thin” was selected as the attitude prime for the Thinness 
conditions whereas “fat” was the attitude prime in the Fatness conditions. The control 
primes included both verbs and nouns that were unrelated to either of the target 
primes (thin or fat); they were table, chair, color, listen, hear, window, circle, shirt, 
weather, cross, sight, under, inside and sideways. All control primes were taken from 
Ferguson (2007) who also used the same sequential priming technique to measure 
automatic attitude towards thinness. For both Attitude Object conditions, the attitude 
stimulus was followed by four different positive words twice and four different 
negative words twice, resulting in four pairs of valence-congruent words and four 
pairs of valence-incongruent words that were presented twice, making a total of 16 
trials that involved the attitude prime. For both Attitude Object conditions, each 
control prime was followed by two different positive words and two different negative 
words, resulting in 28 control primes that were followed by positive words and 28 
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control primes that were followed by negative words. All target words were strongly 
valenced words. There were eight positive target words (beautiful, excellent, 
magnificent, marvelous, cute, delighted, joyful and success) and eight negative target 
words (miserable, hideous, dreadful, painful, scary, disastrous, depressed, and 
failure). The valence of these words were established in past studies and had been 
used successfully in other studies that also used the sequential priming technique to 
measure automatic attitudes (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio et 
al., 1986).  
After completed the sequential priming task, all participants filled up a 
questionnaire that asked about demographic information and an open-ended question 
which aimed to test whether they knew the purpose of this study (see Appendix C). 
Lastly, they were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check and Debriefing. No one knew the real purpose of the study, 
and none of them was aware of the link between the manipulation and the following 
computerized task and questionnaire. As in Study 1 and Study 2, two independent 
raters coded whether the participants followed their respective instructions in doing 
the manipulation description task. That is, the raters coded on whether the participants 
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in the Suppression condition avoided mentioning the positive aspects of being thin (or 
negative aspects of being fat for the Fatness condition), whether those in the 
Expression Control condition mentioned the positive aspects of being thin (or 
negative aspects of being fat for the Fatness condition), and whether those in the 
No-Instruction Control condition described their thoughts specifically about thinness 
(or fatness for the Fatness condition). The agreement rate was considerably 
satisfactory, in that the two raters agree on 93.9% of the passages. All disagreements 
were resolved by discussions and the final scores indicated that 78.8% of those in the 
Suppression condition avoided mentioning positive aspects of thinness (or negative 
aspects of fatness), 97.0% of those in the Expression Control condition mentioned 
positive aspects of thinness (or negative aspects of fatness), and 100% of those in the 
No-Instruction Control condition described their thoughts on thinness (or fatness).  
Computing attitudinal positivity indices. Computation of automatic attitudes 
towards thinness (for the Thinness conditions) and fatness (for the Fatness conditions) 
followed the standard procedure used in past studies (Ferguson, 2007). Incorrect 
responses were first eliminated (error rates = 3.7%). Reaction times (RTs) that were 
slower than 3000 ms and RTs faster than 250 ms were also excluded. Then, all RTs 
were logarithm transformed to obtain smaller values and smaller standard deviation, 
as reaction times recorded in milliseconds have large standard deviation that is likely 
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to render the analysis non-significant even when the effects were strong. For each 
Attitude Object (Thinness vs. Fatness), the RTs for the positive words that followed 
the attitude prime and the RTs for the negative words that followed the target prime 
were averaged respectively to obtain the respective mean latency. The same was done 
for the control primes.  
 It was expected that when the Fatness participants were primed with “fat” (a 
negative prime), they should react faster to negative words but slower to positive 
words. Correspondingly, when the Thinness participants were primed with “thin” (a 
positive prime), responses to positive target word should be facilitated while 
responses to negative target word should be inhibited. In other words, if the attitude 
prime and target word were evaluatively congruent, the response latency should be 
shorter whereas if they were of the opposite valence, the response latency should be 
longer. Therefore, the mean latencies of the valence-congruent pairs were subtracted 
from those of the incongruent pairs to compute an attitude index for attitude primes. 
The same procedure was also done for the control primes to compute the 
corresponding indices for control primes. In particular, in the Thinness conditions, the 
control index was computed by subtracting the mean latency for the positive target 
words that followed the control primes from the mean latency for the negative target 
words that followed the control primes. In the Fatness conditions, the control index 
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was computed by subtracting the mean latency for the negative target words that 
followed the control primes from the mean latency for the positive target words that 
followed the control primes. Two final indices of positivity, called the attitudinal 
positivity towards thinness (APT) and attitudinal negativity towards fatness (ANF) 
were then computed separately by subtracting the respective control index from the 
associated attitude index, resulting in an index that indicated the degree of positivity 
or negativity towards the attitude primes (thin vs. fat) which controlled for individual 
differences in response speed in response to target words followed by the control 
primes. Therefore, higher APT and higher ANF indicated stronger automatic attitudes 
towards the corresponding attitude object (thinness vs. fatness). In particular, higher 
APT means stronger positive attitudes towards thinness, whereas higher ANF means 
stronger negative attitudes towards fatness.  
The Dependent Measures. APT and ANF were entered into an ANOVA as the 
same dependent variable (called Automatic Attitude) with the Attitude Object as 
independent variable. The results showed non-significant mean differences between 
APT (-.01) and ANF (.00; averaged across all Thought conditions within each 
Attitude Object condition), F (1, 95) = .87, p= .35, partial η2 = .01. The Levene’s test 
for the homogeneity of variances was non-significant, F (1, 95) = 2.71, p = .103, 
indicating equal variances for APT (.08) and ANF (.06). Therefore, APT and ANF can 
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be analyzed together as Automatic Attitude.  
 
 
Figure 5: Automatic attitudes as a function of the Suppression, Expression 
Control, and No-Instruction Control conditions.2  
 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted on Automatic Attitude as 
dependent variable. Two predictors that represented the effect of Thought were first 
entered in Step 1. Thought1 tested the main hypothesis that the Suppression condition 
should be higher in Automatic Attitude than both Control conditions across both 
Attitude Objects; whereas Thought2 compared the mean differences between the two 
Control conditions across both Attitude Objects. In Thought1, the Suppression 
condition was coded as 2, whereas both the Expression Control condition and 
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 The means presented in this graph were the log-transformed mean latency differences which denoted 
the attitudinal positivity towards thinness and attitudinal negativity towards fatness after controlling for 
individual differences. The different scores were derived by subtracting the mean latency of 
valence-congruent pairs from that of valence-incongruent pairs. The resulting scores were called 
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No-Instruction Control condition were coded as -1. For Thought2, the Suppression 
condition was coded as 0, Expression Control condition was coded as 1, and 
No-Instruction Control condition was coded as -1. No prior prediction was made on 
Thought2 as this predictor served as a probe to explore whether the two Control 
conditions produced different or similar effects on Automatic Attitude. Again, this 
regression analyses also served as a contrast analyses with appropriate contrast-coded 
predictors entered to test specific predictions. These two predictors accounted for 
significant portion of the variance in Automatic Attitude, R2 = .07, F (2, 94) = 3.73, p 
= .028, indicating a significant main effect of Thought. Thought1 significantly 
predicted Automatic Attitude, t (94) = 2.63, b = .012, SE = .005, p = .01, indicating 
that the Suppression condition was reliably higher in Automatic Attitude than the two 
Control conditions, taken across both Attitude Objects. Thought2 did not predict 
Automatic Attitude, t (94) = .75, b = .006, SE = .008, p = .46, showing that the 
Expression Control condition and No-Instruction Control condition did not differ 
from each other in terms of Automatic Attitude across both Attitude Objects. A 
contrast analysis confirmed that the Suppression condition was higher than the 
Expression Control condition in Automatic Attitudes (see Figure 5), F (1, 96) = 7.20, 
p = .001.  
Next, Attitude Object (all Thinness conditions were coded as 1, all Fatness 
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conditions were coded as -1) was entered in Step 2 to test whether Automatic Attitude 
differed in terms of attitude object. The results indicated that Attitude Object did not 
account for significantly more variance in Automatic Attitude beyond that accounted 
for in Step 1, ∆R2 = .009, F (1, 93) = .94, p = .34. Therefore, this means Attitude 
Object exerted no differential influences on Automatic Attitude.  
In Step 3, the interaction terms Thought1 × Attitude Object and Thought2 × 
Attitude Object (formed from multiplying the respective Thought and Attitude Object 
scores used in Steps 1 and 2) were entered. This would test whether the effects of 
Thought on Automatic Attitudes differed between the two Attitude Objects. These two 
predictors together did not account for significantly more variance in Automatic 
Attitudes beyond that accounted for in Steps 1 and 2, ∆R2 = .03, F (2, 91) = 1.39, p 
= .26. Furthermore, the interaction terms Thought1 × Attitude Object, t (91) = .45, b 
= .002, SE = .005, p = .65, and Thought2 × Attitude Object, t (91) = 1.61, b = .013, SE 
= .008, p = .11, did not predict Automatic Attitude. Therefore, there was no 
interaction effect between Attitude Object and Thought, implying that the effects of 
Thought on Automatic Attitudes did not depend on whether thinness or fatness was 
the attitude object.  
Although the effects of Thought did not differ reliably across attitude objects, 
two contrast analyses were conducted to test whether the observed effects of Thought 
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on APT and on ANF, respectively, were reliable. These contrast analyses were 
conducted as to confirm that APT and ANF of Suppression condition were reliably 
higher than APT and ANF of Expression Control condition. Note that the regression 
analyses could only test the mean differences of Automatic Attitude between 
Suppression condition and the average of Expression Control and No-Instruction 
Control conditions. The mean differences between Suppression condition, and the two 
Control conditions for APT and ANF respectively were not tested. The main 
hypothesis being tested was that the mean (APT for Thinness condition; ANF for 
Fatness condition) in the Suppression condition was higher than the mean in 
Expression Control condition and the mean in the No-Instruction Control condition 
for Thinness and Fatness conditions respectively. The contrast for APT was 
significant, F (1, 48) = 3.91, p = .05, but that for ANF was nearing conventional 
significance level, F (1, 49) = 3.30, p = .07.  
 Summary. Generally, these analyses indicated that across both Attitude Objects, 
Suppression condition showed stronger Automatic Attitudes than both Control 
conditions which did not differed from each other and that this effect of Thought was 
statistically invariant across both Attitude Objects. In essence, the results supported 
the main hypothesis that suppressing an attitude-related thought should strengthen the 
attitude. In particular, suppressing attitude-related thoughts was shown to have 
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increased attitude accessibility and in turn enhanced automatic attitude. This 
suggested that thought suppression should lead to stronger associations between a 
construct and its evaluations, and therefore facilitated the responses to the target 
words that are evaluatively congruent with the attitude object. This resulted in smaller 
response latencies for word pairs with same valence and brought about larger APT 
and ANF, which indicated higher attitude accessibility and therefore stronger 
automatic attitudes. This rebound effect not only manifested in a positive attitude 
object (thinness), but also in a negative object (fatness), suggesting that the ironic 
rebound effect of thought suppression can be generalized to both positive and 
negative issues. This added to the existing evidence that thought suppression should 
strengthen the thought-related attitudes regardless of the valence of attitude objects.  
In addition, because the sequential priming procedure required the participants to 
react as fast as possible, reactance and demand characteristics should be unlikely. 
Particularly, all participants were instructed to react as fast as possible to the target 
words, and that strategic guessing about the valence of the target words was rather 
impossible since the interval between the trials was too short and all the prime words 
and target words were randomly presented. Therefore, their responses should be 
affected by automatic reaction rather than conscious deliberation. When they did not 
have the opportunity and capability to consciously deliberate about their responses, it 
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should be unlikely for them to reinstate their autonomy about their true positions on 
thinness or fatness (reactance, to restore their freewill after being instructed to either 
suppress or express) or to attempt to react in line with the experimenter’s expectation 
(demand characteristics). Furthermore, since the participants did not know the 
purpose of the study nor the relationships between the description task and the 
reaction time task, there was little possibility that the RTs were affected by reactance 
and demand characteristics.  
More importantly, the findings suggested that thought suppression can be an 
effective antecedent of attitude accessibility and automatic attitudes. Whereas other 
findings had shown that suppressing attitude-related thoughts caused rebound effects 
on both attitude certainty and deliberative behaviors, the current findings also 
demonstrated that attitude accessibility and automatic attitudes were also a function of 
thought suppression. As automatic attitudes are different from explicit attitudes in 
terms of its underlying information processes, this also suggests that suppression not 
only can affect people’s subjective evaluation of their attitude strength (i.e., perceived 
themselves as more confident about their attitudes), but also can intensify the strength 
of connections between an attitude object and the evaluations about it in memory, 
therefore increasing attitude accessibility and enhancing automatic attitude. Note that 
only attitudes that are highly accessible can be automatically activated upon 
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observation of the attitude objects. Since automatic attitudes can be triggered without 
conscious effort and motivation, the present findings could also suggest that the 
inclination to perform spontaneous behaviors which generally are associated with 
automatic attitudes could also be enhanced by thought suppression.  
Lastly, the non-significant mean differences between the Expression Control 
condition and No-Instruction Control condition not only indicated that both conditions 
were reliable control conditions, but also further validated the findings in Study 1 and 
Study2. It is clearer now that the Expression Control condition served as an effective 
control condition, in that expressing attitude-related thoughts did not affect attitude 
strength beyond what can be obtained from the No-Instruction condition. Furthermore, 
as previous studies indicated that repeatedly expressing an attitude could strengthen 
the association between the attitude object and its associated evaluations, therefore 
increasing attitude accessibility and strengthening the attitude (Fazio et al., 1982), the 
findings revealed that thought suppression could further enhance the association 




All findings were consistent with the main hypothesis that suppressing 
attitude-relevant thoughts can strengthen the corresponding attitude. This rebound 
effect was demonstrated on different indicators of attitude strength, which included 
attitude certainty and actual-reported weight discrepancy (Study 1), deliberative 
behaviors (Study 2), as well as automatic attitudes (Study 3). In Study 1, both attitude 
certainty and reported weight were affected by thought suppression, in that thought 
suppression was associated with higher attitude certainty and greater actual-reported 
weight discrepancy. In Study 2, attitude-related thought suppression led to behavioral 
rebound, in that the accentuated positive attitude towards thinness caused by thought 
suppression were associated with enhanced inclinations to engage in 
attitude-congruent behaviors. Lastly, automatic attitudes were also examined (Study 3) 
and again the results supported the main hypothesis. Automatic attitudes were 
measured using a sequential priming procedure. This procedure virtually tested the 
strength of association between an attitude object and its evaluative information in 
memory. The results revealed that suppressing attitude-related thoughts increased 
attitude accessibility and enhanced automatic attitudes. Also, the rebound effects were 
similar across attitude objects with opposite valence (thinness and fatness, 
respectively). Because participants had to respond as quickly as they can, the 
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influences of conscious deliberations should be minimal. This last study enabled the 
generalization of the effect of thought suppression on attitude strength from 
deliberative, cognitive and behavioral aspects of attitudes to automatic aspects.  
Essentially, the current findings correspond with the findings in other studies 
about thought suppression. For example, in the white bear studies conducted by 
Wegner et al. (1987), thought suppression increased thought occurrence. In particular, 
participants who suppressed thoughts about white bear subsequently experienced 
higher occurrence of white bear thoughts. Wegner and Gold (1995) found that thought 
suppression led to affective rebound in addition to cognitive rebound. As the final 
example, Macrae et al. (1994) showed that suppressing stereotypic thoughts led to 
more aversive responses against members of the stereotyped group. The current 
findings extended the literature on suppression effects by showing that, due to 
mutually linked information in memory, the cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
components of an attitude can be activated and made more accessible by suppression 
of the attitude-related thoughts, thereby strengthening the associated attitude. 
Furthermore, the strengthened attitudes were demonstrated using different attitude 
strength indicators which not only included the cognitive (Study 1) and behavioral 
(Study 2) aspects, but also the deliberative (Study 1 and Study 2) and automatic 
(Study 3) aspects.  
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As has been shown in previous studies that attitude accessibility can guide 
information processing (Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983; Fazio, 1989; Houston & Fazio, 
1989), it is possible that the enhanced certainty about attitude towards thinness was 
partly due to the temporarily enhanced attitude accessibility towards thinness (Eaton, 
Majka, & Visser, 2008; Holland et al., 2003). This view is supported by the fact that 
attitude certainty and attitude accessibility loaded on a common factor in factor 
analysis (Pomerantz et al., 1995; Bassili, 1996). In addition, it is also probable that the 
relation between attitude and behavior is moderated by attitude accessibility (Fazio & 
Willians, 1986). That is, the greater attitude-congruent behavioral tendency that the 
suppressors displayed was actually a result of the heightened attitude accessibility. 
Furthermore, previous research showed that certainty can serve as moderator in the 
relation between attitude and behavior (Sample & Warland, 1973). Therefore, there 
might be a pathway through which attitude guides behavior. Specifically, it is possible 
that thought suppression would first lead to greater attitude accessibility. This higher 
attitude accessibility in turn results in greater attitude certainty, and due to the 
enhanced confidence, greater tendency of behavioral manifestations can be observed. 
However, it is also possible that the greater attitude accessibility can increase attitude 
certainty and at the same time guide behavior. The current findings were insufficient 
to address this issue, more research could be conducted in the future to investigate the 
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pathway through which attitude guides behavior. In any case, the findings in current 
study echo the previous findings (e.g., Lavine , Huff, Wagner, & Sweeney, 1998; 
Fazio et al., 1982; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Brannon, Tagler, & Eagly, 2007) that 
attitude strength could moderate attitude-behavior relations.  
There are several concerns that should be discussed. First, due to demand 
characteristic, participants might have altered their responses in order to fulfill what 
they thought were the research objectives, especially in measures where conscious 
deliberation could have influenced their responses. However, this appeared unlikely 
since the debriefing showed that no participants figured out the purpose of the studies 
and the connection between the measures. Further, the fact that they had to respond as 
quickly as possible in the sequential priming task meant that there was little 
opportunity for them to consciously deliberate and strategize their responses in that 
task.  
In addition, the theory of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) postulates that 
the feeling of curtailed freedom and deprived autonomy may elicit behaviors intended 
to restore this autonomy. Therefore, it was possible that when participants in the 
Suppression condition and the Expression Control condition received the instructions 
to suppress or express, respectively, their positive views towards thinness (or negative 
views towards fatness), they construed the instructions as a restriction on their 
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autonomy. This perceived restriction might have incited later attempts to indicate 
more extreme responses in direction opposite to what was previously restricted. 
However, like demand characteristics, reactance also requires one to have conscious 
and strategic control over behaviors. Although reactance might have occurred in the 
case of the self-report attitude certainty and weight items, it should be much less 
likely to occur in the case of the sequential priming task (where the influences of 
conscious deliberations and strategic responses should be minimal). The randomized 
order of presentation of the primes and target words in the sequential priming task 
rendered the possibility of strategically evaluating unlikely. The interval between 
prime words and target words as well as the interval between presentations of each 
pair of prime-target words were too short to allow strategic guessing. Further, 
participants appeared ignorant of the connection between the description task and all 
measures examined in this research (i.e., certainty items, weight report, the two 
behavioral indicators, and the sequential priming task). This suggests that reactance 
should be unlikely because reactance is predicated on participants being able and 
willing to consciously change their responses.  
The participants’ attitudes towards thinness and fatness were not assessed before 
the experiments to avoid any speculation about the real purpose of the experiment. 
The experiment design is therefore largely based on the assumption that most people 
69 
hold positive attitude towards thinness and negative attitude towards fatness. 
Although previous studies showed that people generally view thinness as good and 
fatness as bad (e.g., Ahern & Hetherington, 2006; Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2005), 
the possibility that there could be some participants in the three studies who viewed 
thinness as bad and fatness as good could not be completely eliminated. Therefore, I 
briefly discuss the situations where the participants have negative attitude towards 
thinness in the first place here. In the studies, participants in Suppression condition 
were asked to avoid mentioning the positive aspects of thinness and in order to follow 
instruction most of them actually mentioned the negative aspects of thinness. If they 
hold negative attitude towards thinness in the first place, they were actually 
encouraged to express their true attitude towards thinness. On the other hand, the 
participants who were instructed to express the positive aspects of thinness 
(Expression Control condition) would actually have suppressed their negative attitude 
towards thinness. According to some studies (e.g., Fazio, Russell, Chen, Elizabeth, 
McDonel, & Sherman, 1982), repeatedly expressing an attitude can result in stronger 
attitude (higher attitude accessibility). Therefore, those in the Suppression condition 
(i.e., those who expressed their true attitude that thinness is bad) should show more 
negative attitude towards thinness. This possibility would suggest an alternative 
explanation for the results in my three studies. That is, it is possible that the 
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strengthened attitude observed in Suppression condition were actually resulted from 
expressing true negative attitude towards thinness instead of suppressing positive 
attitude towards thinness. However, the participants in the Expression Control 
condition who expressed the positive aspects of thinness would actually have 
suppressed their initial negative attitude towards thinness, as most of them only 
mentioned the positive aspects of thinness. As would be predicted by ironic process 
theory, these participants should demonstrate stronger negative attitude towards 
thinness. As a result, I should not have observed a significant difference between the 
mean of Suppression condition and the mean of Expression Control condition as in 
the three studies because both manipulations (suppression and expression) should 
increase attitude strength. Specifically, in Study 1, participants in Suppression and 
Expression Control conditions should be equally certain of their attitudes because 
both expression and suppression of negative attitude towards thinness could enhance 
their confidence towards their negative attitude. In Study 2, the likelihood that the 
participants in both conditions would choose healthier food option and passage 
concerning fitness should also be comparable. In Study 3, contrary to the current 
results, when being primed with “thin”, the responses to negative words should be 
facilitated and responses to positive words should be inhibited. This should result in 
more negative APT scores instead of the observed positive APT scores in Suppression 
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condition. Furthermore, the APT means of Suppression and Expression Control 
condition should appear lower than that of No-Instruction condition. However, the 
current findings suggested that participants in Suppression condition were reliably 
more positive towards thinness in comparison to those in both Control conditions. 
Therefore, it is less likely that the participants held negative attitude towards thinness 
in the first place. Rather, the evidences in current studies suggest that the participants 
were rather positive towards being thin.  
Another line of studies suggested that expressing a construct could unprime 
(deactivate) the influence of that construct (Sparrow & Wegner, 2006). This would 
suggest that expressing initial negative attitude towards thinness should cause those in 
the Suppression condition to demonstrate weaker negative attitude towards thinness in 
post-suppression period. On the other hand, the ironic process theory would predict 
that those who were asked to express positive aspects of thinness (Expression Control 
condition) should demonstrate stronger negative attitude towards thinness as they 
actually suppressed their true negative attitude towards thinness. As a result, I should 
have observed stronger negative attitude towards thinness in Expression Control 
condition when compared to Suppression condition. Therefore, in Study 1, 
participants in Expression Control condition should be more certain of their attitude 
when compared to those in Suppression condition. Note that the certainty measures 
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only tested the level of confidence the participants have towards their attitude, but did 
not test the valence of attitudes. This expectation is indeed opposite to the current 
results. Furthermore, the accessibility of positivity towards thinness should be below 
zero for both Suppression and Expression Control conditions because response 
latencies to negative words should be smaller than response latencies to positive 
words. The APT mean for No-Instruction Control condition should also appear 
greater than Suppression and Expression Control conditions. However, the positivity 
index was above zero in the Suppression condition, suggesting that responses to 
positive words were facilitated (see Figure 5). The APT mean of No-Instruction 
Control condition also appeared lower than that of Expression Control condition. This 
showed that it is more probable that the participants did not hold negative attitude 
towards thinness in the first place. In conjunction with the previous studies that most 
people adopted the societal standard towards thinness and fatness and viewed thinness 
as good and fatness as bad, it is more possible that most participants indeed held 
positive attitude towards thinness and negative attitude towards fatness, and that the 
obtained results in all three studies are due to the strengthened attitude resulted from 
suppressing positive attitude towards thinness.  
Although both positive and negative attitude objects (thinness and fatness, 
respectively) were found to produce similar rebound effects, it is unclear whether the 
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current findings could generalize to attitudes about other attitude objects. Other 
attitude objects could encompass attitudes towards oneself (e.g., self-esteem), 
attitudes towards other people (e.g., prejudice), personal characteristics (e.g., diligent 
vs. lazy), and habits (e.g., clean and tidy vs. dirty and slovenly). For example, a study 
by Borton et al. (2005) found that participants who suppressed negative thoughts 
about the self subsequently reported lower state self-esteem than those who did not 
suppress the same thoughts. In essence, the extent to which rebound effects on 
attitude strength such as those observed here can be generalized deserves more 
exploration.  
The range of attitude objects can be extended to novel attitude objects as well as 
objects that people have weak attitudes for. Unlike thinness and fatness that people 
have preference for, other attitude objects are novel or unfamiliar to individuals. 
Previous studies (Bargh et al., 1992; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002) 
have shown that people unconsciously evaluate objects that they have only weak 
attitude for and even novel objects that they have not encountered before. In fact, the 
initial attitude strength (strong attitude versus weak attitude) might moderate the 
relationship between suppression and the observed rebound effects. Lavine, Huff, 
Wagner, and Sweeney (1998) demonstrated that weak attitudes were more vulnerable 
to context effects as compared to stronger attitudes. This corresponds with Krosnick 
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and Petty’s (1994) suggestion that strong attitudes are more resistant to change. 
However, how thought suppression would influence attitude strength of the initial 
weak attitudes is unclear. It appears that weak attitudes have more room to be 
polarized than strong and extreme attitudes. Therefore, it is possible that suppressing 
thoughts associated with weak attitudes could polarize the attitudes to a greater extent 
as compared to suppressing thoughts associated with strong attitudes. However, it is 
also likely that suppressing thoughts associated with weak attitudes should not 
produce a rebound effect as strong as suppressing thoughts associated with strong 
attitudes because the initial association between the attitude object and its evaluative 
information is too weak. It also appears possible that suppressing thoughts associated 
with weak attitudes would produce an effect that is opposite to rebound effect as weak 
attitudes are too malleable to change.  
Another interesting issue that is worth examining is the impact of thought 
suppression on contradictory attitudes (attitudes with high attitudinal ambivalence). 
There are many issues that people have mixed attitudes for, such as abortion, 
homosexuality, and euthanasia. According to dual process theory (Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000), people can simultaneously hold more than one attitude towards an 
issue, and these attitudes might contradict each other. Attitudinal ambivalence can be 
conceived as the existence of both positive and negative evaluations and feelings 
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towards an attitude object. Previous attitudinal ambivalence studies demonstrated that 
interpersonal discrepancy (Priester & Petty, 2001) and perceived information basis 
(Tormala & DeSensi, 2008) could affect subjective ambivalence, whereas contextual 
factors are proposed to affect objective ambivalence (cf. Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 
2000). Study conducted by Spokas, Luterek, and Heimberg (2009) showed that 
socially anxious undergraduates reported greater emotional suppression and higher 
ambivalence about emotional expression. However, no research had directly 
examined whether suppression could influence attitudinal ambivalence. Subjective 
ambivalence is characterized as one’s subjective perception of the degree of 
ambivalence towards an attitude object (Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000). Subjective 
ambivalence would encourage systematic information processing (Maio, Bell, & 
Esses, 1996) because the individuals are more motivated to resolve the ambivalent 
situations to reduce uncomfortable feelings. However, for the same reason, the 
individuals might also resort to suppression in order to escape the feelings. It is 
possible that the uncomfortable feelings and subjective ambivalence would then 
become more accessible as a result of suppression. This is because the feelings of 
ambivalence would never be reduced if the individuals do not resolve the 
contradictions. However, the act of suppression would make the inhibited information 
more accessible. For objective ambivalence which is characterized by co-existence of 
76 
both positive and negative evaluations towards an attitude object (Jonas, Broemer, & 
Diehl, 2000), previous studies (e.g., Cavazza & Butera, 2008) showed that attitudes 
with higher ambivalence were more resistant to change. This is because both positive 
and negative evaluations have already existed and thus either evaluation could be 
utilized and expressed according to the specific context. If one aspect of evaluation is 
suppressed, whether or not this suppressed evaluation would then predominate could 
be further examined. This expectation is made on the assumption that suppression 
could make the inhibited information more accessible. In essence, different 
predictions of the effects of suppression are made for subjective ambivalence and 
objective ambivalence respectively, mainly due to their different definitions.  
An issue that is somewhat relevant to dual attitudes is a temporal one. Three 
temporal factors that might moderate the effects of suppression on attitude strength 
are frequency, recency, and duration of suppression. It is possible that these factors 
could affect the strength and the influences of the observed rebound effect. Research 
by Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi (1985) showed that after a brief delay, a recently 
primed stimulus would be more accessible than a frequently primed stimulus. The 
opposite is true for a longer delay, in that a frequently primed stimulus would be more 
accessible than a recently primed stimulus. The highly accessible construct is more 
likely to be utilized in subsequent information processing. This notion of construct 
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activation could also be applied to the case of attitude activation. It is possible that the 
attitude that is more recently activated as a result of recent thought suppression could 
be used immediately to guide information processing. On the other hand, the attitude 
that is more frequently activated as a result of frequent thought suppression should 
guide information processing in the long term. This idea also corresponds with the 
notion about strength of associations between an attitude object and its evaluative 
information. The more frequent the construct is activated, the stronger the strength of 
associations between the construct and its evaluative information, therefore the more 
readily the evaluative information could be utilized in information processing. A study 
by Wastell (2002) concerning long-term emotional reactions suppression with 
ambulance officers revealed that suppression was positively associated with 
physiological and psychological stress symptoms. More importantly, the years of 
ambulance service was positively associated with stress symptoms. This implies that 
the duration of suppression should positively predict the strength of rebound effects 
and the extent of the corresponding influences. According to the synapse model 
(Higgins et al., 1985), the action potential (or energy level) will be elevated to a fixed 
and maximum level after a construct is activated. This action potential will then 
dissipate slowly over time. Therefore, it is possible that the attitudes that are 
frequently and chronically activated would be more durable because the rate of decay 
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is slower. Indeed, it is of theoretical interest to study how long the effects of 
suppression would last and how it might exert its influence on the suppressors’ daily 
life. By manipulating duration, frequency, and recency of thought suppression, the 
strength, persistency and influences of rebound effects could be better understood. 
An attitude would affect evaluation, emotion, and behavior differently when 
different degree of personal relevance or importance is involved. An example is that 
some people might support homosexuality, but they might oppose against it when a 
loved one is a homosexual. A study by Clarkson, Tormala, DeSensi, and Wheeler 
(2009) indicated that only when individuals perceived an attitude as relevant to their 
self-concept, attitude certainty can affect self-certainty. Also, Bizer and Kronsnick 
(2001) showed that the importance of an attitude can increase attitude accessibility. In 
addition, Visser, Krosnick, and Simmons (2003) demonstrated that importance was 
positively associated with information seeking tendency and significantly predicted 
voting behavior. Therefore, attitudes that are highly relevant to the self and personally 
important but socially discouraged might be more susceptible to suppression. Future 
studies could investigate whether personal relevance and importance could moderate 
the relationship between suppression and attitude strength.  
It appears intuitive that actual weight and subjective self-perception of 
thinness/fatness should affect personal attitudes towards thinness and fatness. A fat 
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individual might be constantly stigmatized and therefore would evaluate thinness and 
fatness differently in comparison to normal weight individuals. A study conducted by 
Cash, Counts, and Huffine (1990) revealed that both overweight individuals and 
normal-weight individuals with overweight history were more anxious about having 
their weight taken, were more inclined to perceive themselves as fat, and had higher 
body dissatisfaction as compared to their never-overweight counterparts. It is likely 
for overweight individuals to constantly feel the negative impact of stigmatization and 
the pressure to lose weight. Suppressing negative thoughts and feelings about weight, 
either consciously or unconsciously, might help them to get rid of these thoughts and 
feelings temporarily. However, the current findings would suggest that their 
suppression efforts are likely to lead to stronger negative attitudes towards fatness 
than before. It is possible that suppression played an important role in resulting in 
more negative attitudes towards fatness among individuals with overweight 
experiences. This implies that future studies about attitudes towards thinness and 
fatness should measure self-perception of fatness and overweight history and examine 
how they affect the effects of thought suppression.  
A study by Vartanian, Herman, and Polivy (2005) showed that people generally 
are aware of the societal standards of thinness and fatness, and therefore tend to have 
positive implicit attitudes towards thinness and negative implicit attitudes towards 
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fatness, but only restrained eaters have internalized the social standards and reported 
stronger negative explicit attitudes towards fatness. Individuals who have internalized 
thinness ideals are those who tend to endorse these ideals as their core value and to 
develop appearance schema that associates thinness with positive attributes such as 
happiness, desirability, and status (Tiggemann, 2002). Therefore, those who have 
internalized the thin ideals are more likely to suppress their thoughts related to weight. 
It is possible that suppressing thoughts or emotions pertaining to thinness or fatness 
can result in stronger corresponding attitudes, and in turn leads to the more polarized 
explicit attitudes and the regulatory eating behaviors.  
The effect of suppressing emotions and behavioral impulses remains 
under-examined. The need to suppress emotions or behavioral intentions and impulses 
should be as commonplace as thought suppression. In the study conducted by Wegner 
and Gold (1995), participants suppressed thoughts of their hot-flames. In fact, it is 
possible that the participants also suppressed their emotions, behavioral intentions and 
impulses associated with the hot-flames in addition to suppressing thoughts about the 
still-desired past relationship. Therefore, whether affective suppression and behavioral 
suppression can strengthen the associated attitudes and lead to higher thought 
occurrence, greater emotional arousal, and enhanced behavioral inclination deserves 
further exploration. For instance, it appears possible that suppressing positive affect 
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about a product would result in stronger positive attitudes towards the product and 
therefore might facilitate buying behaviors. Self-control failure was identified as one 
of the causes of impulsive purchasing behavior (Baumeister, 2002). However, whether 
or not suppression (which has been shown to affect self-control) could also facilitate 
purchasing behaviors remains under-studied.  
Behavioral rebound effects might be reflected in both deliberative behaviors and 
spontaneous behaviors. Previous studies showed that deliberative behaviors were 
better predicted by explicit attitudes while spontaneous behaviors were better 
predicted by automatic attitudes (cf. Fazio & Olson, 2003; Asendorpf & Mucke, 
2002). The behavioral indicators used in the current research might have assessed 
deliberative behaviors rather than spontaneous behaviors, since the participants had 
the opportunity to consciously deliberate their responses. Therefore, it is possible that 
their behaviors were affected by conscious deliberations and susceptible to reactance 
and demand characteristics. In fact, automatic attitude was shown to be affected by 
thought suppression in current study. This could imply that thought suppression could 
also increase the likelihood to performing spontaneous behavior. However, this notion 
was not directly tested in the current study. Future study should examine whether 
thought suppression also affects spontaneous behaviors (e.g., facial expressions) 
which are generally associated with automatic attitudes that rely on automatic and 
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unconscious information processing.  
Lastly, although the cognitive and behavioral components of attitudes were 
examined in this research, the affective component was not. It was unclear that what 
kind of emotion would be elicited after suppressing positive thoughts about thinness 
or negative thoughts about fatness. Furthermore, whether similar rebound effect 
would be found on other indicators of attitude strength (such as importance, 
ambivalence, and extremity) is unclear. Future research that investigates the effects of 
suppression on attitude towards thinness and fatness could extend the current research 
by examining the above variables.  
In sum, the current findings have extended the literature on attitude antecedents, 
in demonstrating that attitude strength is also a function of suppression in addition to 
situational factors such as goal-states (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). As suppression 
increases the action potential of a construct (e.g., thought, emotion, or behavior), it 
implies that the energy level of other related constructs (e.g., attitude) could also be 
heightened due to the spreading activation. Therefore, the sense of controllability that 
most people desire seems difficult to attain, as their efforts to exert control through 
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Appendix A: Manipulation (Thinness) 
Materials for Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 
 
 
Attitude Object: Thinness (Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3) 
 
Suppression Condition (Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3) 
In this study, we like to know about your impression of ‘thinness’. In other words, we 
like to know what is your impression about being thin. Please take some time to think 
about ‘being thin’ and then write down your thoughts below. However, given that 
being thin has many advantages and is highly desirable in general, for this study, we 
need you to try as hard as possible not to think about the positive aspects of being thin. 
That is, when you are thinking about thinness, try to avoid thinking about the positive 
aspects of being thin. And when you are describing your thoughts about thinness, try 
to avoid saying any positive things about being thin.  
 
Expression Control Condition (Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3) 
In this study, we like to know about your impression of ‘thinness’. In other words, we 
like to know what is your impression about being thin. Please take some time to think 
about ‘being thin’ and then write down your thoughts below. Given that being thin has 
many advantages and is highly desirable in general, for this study, feel free to think 
about the positive aspects of being thin. That is, when you are thinking about thinness, 
think freely about the positive aspects of being thin. And when you are describing 
your thoughts about thinness, feel free to say the positive things about being thin.  
 
No-Instruction Control Condition (only for Study 3) 




Appendix B: Manipulation (Fatness) 
Materials for Study 3 
 
 
Attitude Object: Fatness (Study 3) 
 
Suppression Condition 
In this study, we like to know about your impression of ‘fatness’. In other words, we 
like to know what is your impression about being fat. Please take some time to think 
about ‘being fat’ and then write down your thoughts below. However, given that being 
fat has many disadvantages and is highly undesirable in general, for this study, we 
need you to try as hard as possible not to think about the negative aspects of being fat. 
That is, when you are thinking about fatness, try to avoid thinking about the negative 
aspects of being fat. And when you are describing your thoughts about fatness, try to 
avoid saying any negative things about being fat.  
 
Expression Control Condition 
In this study, we like to know about your impression of ‘fatness’. In other words, we 
like to know what is your impression about being fat. Please take some time to think 
about ‘being fat’ and then write down your thoughts below. Given that being fat has 
many disadvantages and is highly undesirable in general, for this study, feel free to 
think about the negative aspects of being fat. That is, when you are thinking about 
fatness, think freely about the negative aspects of being fat. And when you are 
describing your thoughts about fatness, feel free to say the negative things about being 
fat.  
 
No-Instruction Control Condition 





Appendix C: Demographic Information and Debriefing Question 
Materials for Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 
 
 













Email address: ___________________________________________ 
 
Programme: Diploma /Undergraduate/ Master by coursework/ Master by research/ 
P.h.d./ Others (Please 
indicate:___________________________________)  
(Please circle your answer.)  
 
Department: __________________ 
(E.g., Psychology, Mechanical Engineering, English language) 
 
 









Appendix D: Attitude Certainty  
Materials for Study 1 
 
 
Please answer the following questions. There are no right or wrong answers. Please 
make your choices according to your personal position.  
 
 
How certain are you about (meaning how strongly do you believe in) your beliefs 
about being thin?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all 




How sure are you about your beliefs regarding being thin? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all 




How confident are you about your beliefs regarding being thin?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all 





My weight is __________kg.  





Appendix E: Email Questionnaire  
Materials for Study 2 
 
 
Please answer the following questions in the way that best describe you. There are no 
right or wrong answers, but we like to know your true responses. Please make your 
choices according to your personal experience by TYPING 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 in the 
bracket at the front side of each question.  
 
(   ) Please rate the degree of healthiness of the food offered by Burger King.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 




(   ) Please rate the degree of healthiness of the food offered by Subway.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 




(   ) Please rate the degree to which you like the food offered by Burger King.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all   Neutral   Very 
much 
 
(   ) Please rate the degree to which you like the food offered by Subway.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Please type your answers below.  
 




Please double check that you have answered all the questions in this 
questionnaire. 
Thank you for your time. ☺ 
 
